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Abstract 
 
Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2 – sit-ins resulting in the expulsion of old-regime 
ministers, the installation of a technocratic government, and the promise of 
elections – are generally regarded as two of the most important popular actions in 
the Tunisian Revolution. Left as a footnote to this history is Kasbah 3, a third 
sit-in widely considered to be a failed, radical movement corrosive to the 
successes of the Revolution. Eight years later, with the election of Kais Saied and 
the failure of the pre-revolutionary establishment Bourguibist movement, the 
spirit of Kasbah 3 appears to have returned. This paper seeks to demonstrate the 
importance of Kasbah 3 by tracing the politics which emerged from the sit-in and 
connecting them with the emerging movements that created the conditions for the 
victory of Tunisian President Kais Saied. The study consists of mostly reviews of 
primary source materials, an interview, and quantitative data from 
post-Revolution Tunisian elections. In discussing election results, the execution 
and criticisms of Kasbah 3, and the organizations and personalities that emerged 
from it, this study finds direct and indirect connections between Kais Saied and 
Kasbah 3. More importantly, it paints a picture of the rise of a politics, unspecific 
to Saied, designed to disrupt the remaining influences of the pre-Revolutionary 
status quo.  
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 Introduction 
Revolutions are, by necessity, disparate movements. As such, the question 
of “when should the revolution end?” is disputed and is often left unresolved. 
After the repressive dictator Zine Abadine Ben Ali fled, Tunisians continued to 
take to the streets. In two sit-ins, called Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2, Tunisians 
flooded the government square demanding a series of concessions from the 
interim government. Kasbah 1 succeeded in forcing reforms ranging from the 
ousting of Ben Ali ministers to the establishment of a political reform 
commission while Kasbah 2 forced the government to agree to a date for 
democratic elections for a body to draft a new constitution. Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 
2 are lionized as two of the most consequential actions of the Revolution, but a 
third Kasbah sit-in is often left as a footnote in the history of the Tunisian 
Revolution.  
Understanding Kasbah 3 and the politics that emerged from it demands 
the historical context of pre-revolutionary Tunisia. After independence from the 
French in 1956, the regime of Habib Bourguiba, and subsequently Ben Ali, 
sought to position Tunisia as a modern, Western state. In an effort to repress 
political Islam, Bourguiba set in place a series of liberal reforms emphasizing 
women’s and minority rights, a consolidated state, development, and the 
replacement of Islamic education with Western schooling.  After taking over in a 1
“medical coup” Ben Ali established a more generally repressive regime, but 
1Marion Bouldy, "The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence." ​Third World Quarterly 
10, no. 2 (1988): 590-614, www.jstor.org/stable/3992658. 
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expanded upon Bourbuiba’s economic development policy by enthusiastically 
seeking foreign loans and investment. These policies failed to create economic 
growth and resulted in skyrocketing debt and unemployment, conditions that for 
the Revolution.   2
After the ousting of Ben Ali and the second sit-in, Bourguiba’s former 
Foreign Affairs Minister Beji Caid Essebsi was placed in charge of the 
technocratic government. Kasbah 3, held four months after Kasbah 2, defined 
itself in opposition to the technocratic government and the leadership of interim 
Prime Minister Essebsi. Kasbah 3 failed to garner widespread support, the 
government quickly quashed the protest, and today it is generally regarded as a 
failure. For those who partook in Kasbah 3, the Revolution was about more than 
democratization, it a movement to wrest political power from old-regime 
officials, elite figures, and Western influence.  Democratic elections were not 3
enough if they were of, by, and for politicians who had been ingrained in the 
political status quo of the last half-century.  
The failure of the sit-in followed by a series of electoral victories by 
institutional actors, quashed any notion that Tunisia desired a continuation of the 
Revolution. The success of the Islamist party, Ennahdha, in the 2011 NCA 
elections instilled a fear of rising Islamism. The nomination of Ennahdha-backed 
Moncef Marzouki and the secular Essebsi in the 2014 Presidential elections, 
2 Lahcen Achy, “Tunisia’s Economic Challenges“ Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, December 2011, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/tunisia_economy.pdf 
3 3 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​ i​ “ماصتعإ يف ةیبعش بلاطم نوكتل نلآا دح ىلغ اهیلع قفّتملا ةیساسلأا بلاطملا” Facebook, July 
14th, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/14680624872
8752/?type=3&theater​. 
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revealed that the political paradigm in Tunisia’s first presidential election would 
continue to be a religious-secular one. Five more years of a stagnant economy, 
corruption, and declining Islamist power opened the door for challenges to this 
paradigm. The landslide victory of outsider Kais Saied who advocated for a 
decentralization of government, a crackdown on corruption, and cutting ties with 
the west, marked the emphatic triumph of a new politics independent of the old 
regimes and of political Islam.  
An echo of Kasbah 3, the 2019 Presidential elections mark a transition in 
Tunisia toward a politics unsullied by its dictatorial history. For the first time in 
its post-colonial history, the country will be led by a figure not associated with 
the regimes of Bourguiba or Ben Ali. In this study I will evaluate the political 
movements that contributed to and were borne out of Kasbah 3, following them 
through their seeming disappearance under Beji Caid Essebsi to their 
re-emergence in the politics of Kais Saied. This evaluation will bring to light the 
shifting political paradigm in Tunisia, how it began, how it evolved, and how it is 
manifesting itself in today’s politics.  
 
 
Methodology 
This study draws upon primary sources, qualitative data, and secondary 
source quantitative data. The former derives from a range of sources including 
Facebook posts, articles, and public statements from the revolutionary period as 
well as an interview with a sit-in attendee. The Facebook posts were primarily 
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utilized in the description and documentation of the planning of Kasbah 3. The 
public statements and articles give an outside perspective on the politics of 
Kasbah 3. The interview was a semi-structured with prepared questions and 
follow-ups. For the purposes of anonymity and in accordance with SIT policy, 
the pseudonym “Firas” was given to the interviewee.  
Given that Kasbah 3 did not have public leadership, it was difficult to find 
definitive statements about the movement. While this does speak to the 
decentralized nature of Kasbah 3, it also presents a research challenge in that no 
one person can speak for the movement. The Facebook page “3 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ” 
(The Kasbah 3 Sit-in) most closely resembled any official presence of the 
movement.  
As for secondary source material, extraordinarily little has been written 
about Kasbah 3. The vast majority of mentions of Kasbah 3 in academic sources 
are in the context of the history of the Revolution and rarely reach beyond a 
description of the sit-in as a failed movement. In my research I struggled to find 
articles that mentioned Kasbah 3 as anything more than an aside. Most of the 
secondary source material utilized in this study addresses revolutionary history 
prior Kasbah 3 or discusses Tunisian election results. A plethora of research 
exists in both of these areas. In my discussion of Tunisian revolutionary history, I 
mostly utilized broader reviews while for the discussion of the elections I draw 
upon more specific studies including studies of election results and surveys of 
candidates. 
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There is plenty left to be researched on the subject of Kasbah 3. I would 
implore future researchers with more time and resources than myself to dig 
deeper into the organization and planning of Kasbah 3. Hopefully, with the 
ascendance of a politics that reflects Kasbah 3, this body of research will begin to 
emerge.  
 
 
Research Findings and Analysis 
Kais Saied and Revolution at the Ballot Box 
Through Tunisia’s history as a young democracy, Islamism and 
Bourguibism, an establishment movement advocating for the maintenance of the 
Bourguiba’s political order, have thrived at the ballot box. The shift toward these 
movements after the fall of Ben Ali should be seen as reactionary rather than 
organic. Uncertainty in the wake of the Revolution pushed the populous toward 
familiar political figures and movements, but each subsequent election after the 
Revolution demonstrates an erosion in the support for these groups. The gradual 
erosion of support for Ennahdha and the breakup of Nidaa Tunis, Essebsi’s 
secular Bourguibist party, demonstrate that these movements were vestiges of 
Tunisia’s old political era. The victory of Kais Saied ushers in a new era of 
Tunisian politics, one constructed by ideas and movements formed in the 
Revolution rather than by Tunisia’s dictatorial past. 
The longevity and stability of the Bourguiba regime can be attributed, in 
part, to a suppression of political Islam in Tunisia. By exiling the Ennahdha 
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movement, advocating for liberal social causes, and expanding secular 
francophone education, Bourguiba positioned himself in opposition to political 
Islam.  While Ben Ali did not pursue these particular reforms as heavily, by 4
maintaining a status quo under which political Islam was banned, he reinforced 
notion of Tunisia as a secular nation.  With the fall of Ben Ali came the 5
predictable return of the political Islamist movement. After nearly a half century 
of dictatorship preceded by French colonial rule, the extent of the popularity of 
political Islam was a mystery. The movement’s strength would become the first 
political question – in both order and importance – after the Revolution and 
would dominate both the 2011 National Constitutional Authority elections and 
the 2014 Legislative and Presidential elections.  
The 2011 and 2014 elections were centered on reaction and 
counter-reaction to the issues of secularity and political Islam. The 2011 elections 
proved Ennahdha and their political Islamist movement to be simultaneously 
Tunisia’s strongest political movement and one that failed to gain the support of 
the majority of Tunisians. Longstanding perceptions of Ennahdha as an 
upstanding opposition religious movement rooted in local connection facilitated a 
sweeping victory. Capturing 89 of the NCA’s 217 seats, Ennahdha formed a 
coalition with the secular Ettakatol and CPR parties in what became known as the 
Troika Government. The Troika government quickly became mired in 
controversy after it took a number of steps to establish its authority over the 
existing technocratic government and beyond its mandate to draft the 
4Marion Bouldy, "The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence."  
5Razaman Yildirim, "Transformation of the Ennahdha Movement from Islamic Jama’ah to 
Political Party." ​Insight Turkey​ 19, no. 2 (2017): 189-214, www.jstor.org/stable/26300510. 
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constitution. Numerous delays in the constitutional drafting process, accusations 
that Ennahdha sought to implement Sharia law into the constitution, and 
increasing violence spurned by Islamists sparked protests demanding a rapid and 
equitable constitutional process. Eventually The National Dialogue Quartet 
brought the Troika Government to the table, the constitution was completed, and 
the stage was set for the 2014 elections.   6
The strength of Ennahdha demanded a united and experienced secular 
opposition. Essebsi, as former Foreign Affairs Minister under Bourguiba and 
interim President of the technocratic government, emerged as the consensus 
candidate for the secular movement. The attempted power grab of the Troika 
government, increasing Islamist violence, and the strength of Essebsi as a 
candidate contributed to newly founded Nidaa Tunis’s success in 2014. The first 
round of the Presidential election revealed itself to be a re-litigation of the 
2011-2014 period. Former Troika President Moncef Marzouki, backed by 
Ennahdha, placed second in the Presidential run-offs edged out by Essebsi. 
Essebsi’s second round victory and Nidaa Tunis’s success winning a plurality of 
seats in the Parliament re-established secular control of Tunisia’s government.   7
The 2011 and 2014 elections marked a choice between actors whose 
politics were largely understood through the lens of the pre-revolutionary era. 
Tunisia's 2018 Local elections represented the first opportunity for movements 
and ideologies constructed after the Revolution to find electoral success. Amidst 
6 Crown Center for Middle East Studies, “Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia’s Ennahdha 
Nine Months In” Brandeis University, September, 2012, 
https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/1-100/meb66.pdf​. 
7Muddassir Quamar, “Tunisia: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2014” Contemporary 
Review of the Middle East, DOI: 10.1177/2347798915603277, 2015. 
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eroding support for Ennahdha and Nidaa Tunis, independent lists claimed a 
plurality of local seats. The relatively poor results for both Ennahdha and Nidaa 
Tunis signal not only a distaste for Tunisia’s political establishment, but also a 
decline in the import of the question of secularity.   8
The success of independents would suggest the emergence of an 
anti-establishment politics possibly similar to that of Kasbah 3 but an opinion 
survey of locally elected officials by Democracy Index complicates this narrative. 
The study finds that while Independent candidates generally distrust political 
institutions more than other parties, they were not more likely to have 
participated in strikes or protests and were no more supportive of sit-ins and 
protests during the Revolution than other parties (see Appendix A). Additionally, 
independent lists were second only to Nidaa Tunis in their inclusion of former 
members of Ben Ali’s governing party, the RCD (see Appendix B).  The 2018 9
elections demonstrate a change in the mindset of the Tunisian electorate. The 
black and white contrast of the question of secularity ceded ground to more vague 
notions of institutional support and trust in government. While the 2019 elections 
did establish new political forces that exist outside of the secular-religious 
dominated by Ennahdha and Nidaa Tunis, they were ill-defined and unstructured.  
The collapse Ennahdha and the Boruguibist movement continued in the 
2019 Legislative and Presidential elections, but this time a clearer politics 
emerged in its place. The first round of the Presidential elections saw an 
8Aytuğ Şaşmaz, Alexandra Blackman, and Julia Clark, “One third of new municipal councilors in 
Tunisia are from independent lists. How independent are they?” Democracy International, July 
2018, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/530792ebe4b04ca998b96b34/t/5b636a3f2b6a28b01c12baf2
/1533241921425/lecs_brief_independents.pdf 
9 Ibid. 
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implosion of the remnants of the Nidaa Tunis movement. The breakup of the 
party following a long spell of internal disputes since the election of Essebsi left 
the mostly coalitional movement without a torchbearer.  While eventually 10
independent candidate and current Defense Minister Zbidi became the heir to the 
movement, Bourguibist’s failure to organize resulted in a fourth-place finish for 
Zbidi. Ennahdha’s candidate Mourou did not fare much better, finishing in third.
 Advancing to the runoff were two independent candidates with little 11
institutional backing: Kais Saied who promised a fundamental restructuring of 
the state and Nabil Karoui whose vague platform mostly focused on addressing 
poverty.  12
With a shoestring campaign and only a small amount of advertising, Saied 
decisively won the runoff election with 74% of the vote.  Saied’s politics neither 13
resemble that of Ennahdha nor any of the Bourugibist parties. Instead, Saied’s 
politics take advantage of the political void demonstrated by the 2019 
independent movement to implement a politics in accordance with the 
revolutionary values of Kasbah 3. Saied, who attended Kasbah 3 himself, sought 
to build a state independent of Western thought and centralized power. ,  His 14 15
10 ​Asma Ajroudi​ &​ Ramy Allahou​, “Tunisia’s Nidaa Tunis Movement in Shambles Amid Political 
Turbulence” Al Jazeera, December 5, 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/tunisia-nidaa-tounes-shambles-political-turbulence-18
1202090020299.html​. 
11 ​Rim Hana. “Tunisia- The ISIE releases official results for 2019 early presidential elections” 
Tunisie Numerique. September 17th, 2019. 
https://news-tunisia.tunisienumerique.com/tunisia-the-isie-releases-official-results-for-2019-early-
presidential-elections/​. 
12Munathara, “Tonight’s #Tunisia Debate” Periscope, Accessed December 8th, 2019. 
https://www.pscp.tv/w/1yoKMzYoAZoGQ​. 
13 BBC, “Tunisia election: Kais Saied to become President” October 14th, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50032460​. 
14AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
15 Kais Saied, “Its Religion is Islam” Commmencment at the University of Tunis, September 14th, 
2018, ​https://ultratunisia.ultrasawt.com/
Braverman 14 
 
victory not only was symbolic of Kasbah 3 as eight years later Saied successfully 
replaces the Essebsi government, but also runs in accordance with a Kasbah 3 
ideology that demands separation from the West, uprooting of corruption, and the 
destruction of an old political establishment. Saied’s victory marks the 
long-delayed success of Kasbah 3 by empowering a politics independent of the 
pre-revolutionary secular-religious distinction imposed by Ben Ali and Bouguiba. 
 
Spontaneity, Secularism, and Legitimate Revolution 
Unlike Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2, the Kasbah 3 movement was seen by 
many as a radical attempt to disrupt revolutionary progress. Essebsi attacked the 
protesters as “extremists” stating that they were “actors who everyone knows.”16
These vague accusations levied by Essebsi, seeking to paint the sit-in as an 
Islamist plot, stoked fears that Islamists could attempt to compromise the 
progress of the Revolution.  Essebsi calculated these accusations with the aim of 17
removing perceptions of the movement’s spontaneity and secularism, two 
characteristics that were closely associated with the Tunisian Revolution at-large. 
The hostile reaction and attempts to delegitimize Kasbah 3 by elites informs later 
attempts to delegitimize new political movements. Examining criticisms of 
Tunisian political movements on the basis of their secularity and spontaneity 
تلایلحت/ةسایس/سنوت-ارتلا/ةلودلاو-نیدلا-نیب-ةقلاعلا-يف-رفحیو-صوغی-دّیعس-سیق-اهنید-ملاسلإا, Trans. Mohamed 
Obaid, Kirkuk 2019. 
16 H. Manel, “Kasbah 3 est Illégitime, il est orchestré par des extrémistes qui veulent freiner les 
élections…” Tuniscope, July 18th, 2011, 
https://www.tuniscope.com/article/8266/actualites/politique/kasbah-034215  
17 Omar Tiss, “Urgent: BCE: Le sit-in de La Kasbah 3 n’avait pas de raison d’être” Tunisie 
Numerique, July 19th, 2011, 
https://www.tunisienumerique.com/urgent-bce-le-sit-in-de-la-kasbah-3-navait-pas-de-raisons-detr
e/​. 
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reveals a pattern of attempts to limit the popular conception of the Tunisian 
revolutionary spirit by excluding Kasbah 3 politics.  
Kasbah 3 took place in a fundamentally different environment from 
Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2. Protesters had successfully ousted the Ben Ali regime 
and any remaining official no longer sought to maintain the power of the regime. 
Additionally, Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2 took place under a destabilized government 
that had little ability to control the protest movements. Kasbah 3, meanwhile, 
occurred under a popular technocratic government which had established a new 
police force.  The disorganization of the Ben Ali government and the scale of 18
Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2 allowed them to take place relatively spontaneously 
whereas at Kasbah 3, the failure of organizers to obtain a protest permit resulted 
in a police crackdown and the arrest of 34 individuals.  The consequences of the 19
failure to obtain this permit is demonstrative of both a change in the conditions 
under which Kasbah 3 took place and the consequences of disorganization for the 
protesters.  
In addition to the stability of the technocratic government, Kasbah 3 took 
place months after many considered the Revolution to be over. The protest sought 
to challenge this notion, but the fact remained that the first two sit-ins satisfied 
the revolutionary appetite of many Tunisians. Lacking enough popular support 
for a spontaneous protest, Kasbah 3 organizers took to a familiar tool of the 
Revolution: Facebook. The Facebook page, created March 12, 2011, formed a 
18 ​AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
19 ​Business News, “Kasbah 3 : les raisons d'un échec annoncé” July 18th, 2011, 
https://www.businessnews.com.tn/kasbah-3--les-raisons-dun-eec-annonce,519,25717,1​. 
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space in which the planning of the sit-in could be crowd-sourced.  The page 20
published drafts of demands for public comment, interacting with those who had 
input in the comment section (see Appendix C).  While these demands went 21
through a long editing process, there were many other posts which made informal 
demands including one which called for the removal of Essebsi and provided 
options for his replacement.  Who exactly made decisions as to this editing 22
process and the publishing of informal demands remains unclear. Even the first 
post declaring the official date of Kasbah 3, only took place five days before the 
event itself.  What is apparent is that there was some sort of group or individual 23
that had been planning the sit-in for months.  
The space did not exist solely for planning the Revolution, but also for 
forging an anti-Western, anti-Zionist and anti-RCD politics through sharing 
memes, articles, and images (see Appendix D). , ,  The posts mostly attack 24 25 26
Essebsi, the technocratic government, and the RCD for stymying the Revolution 
and promise a return to the Kasbah as a response. The page sought to 
203 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​ i​ Home Page, Facebook, Accessed December 7th, 2019, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/?ref=page_internal​.  
213 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ, ​i ​“؟؟ءامسلأا هذه لوح مكقیلعت ام و بلاطملا هذه يف مكیأر ام” Facebook, July 20th, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/149554785120565/?ty
pe=3&theater 
223 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ, ​i ​“اللها ءاشنا يفنس و اندعو” Facebook, March 29th, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/120680541341323/?ty
pe=3&theater​. 
233 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ, ​i ​“ةدوعلا ماصتعإ” Facebook, July 10th, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/145140975561946/?ty
pe=3&theater​. 
243 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​i​ “سرب سنارف ةلاكو لسارم دافا ام ىلع.” Facebook, March 16th, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/117974008278643/?ty
pe=3&theater​. 
253 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​i​ “لیئارسإب فرتعنلا نحن.” Facebook, March 15th, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/130222567053787/?ty
pe=3&theater​. 
263 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​i​ “لیرفا 24 موی لیلق ذنم انلخد” Facebook, April 23rd, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/E3tisam.el9asba.3/photos/a.116976275045083/125814767494567/?ty
pe=3&theater​. 
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simultaneously build a politics, a community, and a movement that would 
culminate in Kasbah 3. While not a tool for the construction of spontaneous 
movements, Facebook was vital to the existence of a protest that aimed to build a 
political movement and community rather than topple a government. Spontaneity 
might have been a central component of the Revolution under the Ben Ali 
regime, but in order for the Revolution to continue under a popular technocratic 
government, it needed to take to social media to increase its reach, remain out of 
reach of the authorities, and build a community of dedicated ideologues.  
The lack of transparency in the planning of Kasbah 3, its use of Facebook 
as a crutch, the relatively small turnout, and the ultimate failure of the protest left 
the movement open to criticism from Essebsi’s technocratic government.  The 27
validity of Essebsi’s attacks, suggesting Kasbah 3 to be an Islamist plot, were 
disputed and unverifiable, but they signal a larger trend of post-Revolution efforts 
to stoke fear surrounding political Islam. ,  Bourguibists continued to utilize this 28 29
attack through the 2019 Presidential elections directing them toward any 
movement that sought to oppose Bourguibism.  The fear evoked in these attacks 30
is certainly legitimate, political Islam until the Revolution was the sole political 
threat to the Ben Ali and Bourguiba regimes. The fall of the Ben Ali regime and 
subsequent democratization surely provoked a fear that political Islam would fill 
27 ​Business News, “Kasbah 3 : les raisons d'un échec annoncé.” 
28 ​Omar Tiss, “Urgent: BCE: Le sit-in de La Kasbah 3 n’avait pas de raison d’être”  
29 Omar Tiss, “Rached Ghannouchi: Ennahdha est contre la violence et soutient les revendications 
des sit-inneurs de Kasbah 3” Tunisie Numerique, July 19th, 2011, 
https://www.tunisienumerique.com/rached-ghannouchi-ennahdha-est-contre-la-violence-et-soutie
nt-les-revendications-des-sit-inneurs-de-kasbah-3/​. 
30 Business News, “Témoignage de Jaouhar Ben M'barek à propos de Kaïs Saïed” September 
16th, 2019, 
https://www.businessnews.com.tn/temoignage-de-jaouhar-ben-mbarek-a-propos-de-kais-saied,52
0,91069,3​. 
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the void and in 2014 those fears were confirmed with the victory of Ennahdha. 
The subsequent decline in Islamist power caused this argument to crumble and 
the labeling of Kais Saied as an Islamist in the 2019 Presidential election 
demonstrated its weakness.  While these attacks might have been effective 31
enough when Essebsi used them to target the Kasbah 3 protesters, Essebsi’s own 
success in defeating political Islam at the ballot box quelled fears of this threat.  32
Attacks directed toward Kasbah 3 on the basis of its secularism and 
spontaneity sought to discredit a movement that threatened to create a new 
politics to challenge Bourguibism. As those legitimate fears have receded, the 
continued attacks on movements presenting alternatives to Bourguibism have 
declined in efficacy. The result of these receding fears is a decline in the impact 
of labelling movements as Islamist, allowing opportunities for new styles of 
politics rooted neither in Islamism nor Bourguibism to emerge. This shifting 
dynamic has propelled movements constructed during the Kasbah 3 sit-in to the 
forefront of Tunisian politics.  
 
Intellectuals, Grassroots Movements and Resuscitating the Revolution 
The fall of Ben Ali opened the door for the participation of academics and 
activists in the political sphere. Kasbah 3, as a relatively small movement within 
the Revolution, provided an opportunity for those interested in more extreme 
ideals to stake out their territory as dedicated revolutionaries. Kasbah 3 politics, 
31 Kaouther Larbi, “Outsiter Kais Saied, backed by Islamist party, set to win presidency in 
Tunisia” October 14th, 2019, Times of Israel, 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/outsider-kais-saied-backed-by-islamist-party-set-to-win-presidenc
y-in-tunisia/​. 
32AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
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defined by an ant-establishment effort to keep the Revolution alive, has been 
adopted by a number of political figures and organizations emerging from 
Kasbah 3 movement. These people and organizations have sought to reinvigorate 
the revolutionary spirit for the purpose of building a movement to challenge elite 
institutions.  
The most successful, of course, has been Tunisian President Kais Saied 
and the ideological movement surrounding him. Many in the Kais Saied’s inner 
circle attended the sit-in and their ideologies often closely align with Kasbah 3 
ideals. Through communication with journalists and sit-in attendees I confirmed 
that activist and public Saied supporter Sonia Charbti and campaign advisor 
Abderraouf Betaieb both attended Kasbah 3. ,  Bettaieb, a former diplomat and 33 34
legal scholar, was appointed Cabinet Minister shortly after Saied assumed office.
 Charbti, while not directly tied to the Kais Saied campaign, posted photos on 35
her Facebook of her campaigning with Saied almost four months before he 
officially announced his campaign (see Appendix E). ,  Additionally, Charbti 36 37
has produced work for an organization by the name of Ligue des Forces de 
33 AJ Braverman, 2019, Twitter Direct Message with journalist, December 2, 2019.  
34 The journalist from who I obtained this information also said that they thought Saied and 
Bettaied met at Kasbah 3 but that they could not be sure. 
35 Il Boursa, “Le Diplomate Abderraouf Bettaieb, serait désigné Chef de cabinet du Président de la 
République” October 23rd, 2019. 
https://www.ilboursa.com/marches/le-diplomate-abderraouf-bettaieb-serait-designe-chef-de-cabin
et-du-president-de-la-republique_19332 
36 Tunisie Numerique, “VIDEO : Kaïs Saïed annonce son intention de se porter candidat aux 
prochaines présidentielles” December 28th, 2017, 
https://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-video-kais-saied-annonce-son-intention-de-se-porter-c
andidat-aux-prochaines-presidentielles/​. 
37 Sonia Charbti, “Uncaptioned Image” Facebook, Accessed December 8th, 2019, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1615733678500669&set=picfp.100001921575023&t
ype=3&theater​. 
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Tunisie Libre (FTL).  Kais Saied’s closest campaign advisor Ridha Mekki 38
founded the FTL during the Revolution in 2011 and Kais Saied is known to 
attend meetings. ,  39 40
The FTL is an organization dedicated to creating “anti-system” political 
movements.  According to their Facebook page the FTL has a loose structure 41
suggesting no formal membership or leadership, however it is clear that Mekki 
plays a large role as a spokesperson, thinker and activist.  Mekki is no stranger to 42
taking on large institutions; he gained political experience after founding Wataj, 
an organization which sought to challenge the ​Union Générale des Étudiants de 
Tunisie, Tunisia’s national student union​.  His action with the FTL has been no 43
less bold. Mekki has frequently called for a fundamental restructuring of the 
post-Revolution democratic order.  
Mekki spelled out his views on what he sees as a failed post-Revolution 
politics in an article posted on the FTL Facebook page entitled, “Is the idea - the 
historical bloc - a way out of the disruption of the Tunisian Revolution?” The 
article does not seek to directly answer the question, but rather puts forth a 
38 Sonia Charbti, “ة ّرحلا سنوت ىوق يه نم” LinkedIn, Accessed December 8th, 2019, 
https://www.slideshare.net/SoniaCharbti/-8295333​. 
39Khaled Boumiza, “​Le secret de «Robocop» levé. Simple devanture publique pour les FTL de 
«Lénine»?” 
40 ​Maisie Odone, “Jemna’s Land Collective Looks to New President With Hope” October 31st, 
2019, Meshkal, 
http://mesh-kal.com/2019/10/31/jemnas-collective-land-association-looks-to-new-president-with-
hope/​. 
41 Khaled Boumiza, “​Le secret de «Robocop» levé. Simple devanture publique pour les FTL de 
«Lénine»?” September 17th, 2019, Africa Manager, 
https://africanmanager.com/le-secret-de-robocop-leve-simple-devanture-publique-pour-les-ftl-de-l
enine/​. 
42 Ligue Des Forces De La Tunisie Libre, “About” Accessed December 8th, 2019, 
https://www.facebook.com/pg/LIGUE-DES-FORCES-DE-LA-TUNISIE-LIBRE-1268876140608
91/ةرحلا-سنوت-ىوق-ةطبار/about/?ref=page_internal 
43 Khaled Boumiza, “​Le secret de «Robocop» levé. Simple devanture publique pour les FTL de 
«Lénine»?” 
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doctrine. Declaring the “constitution in the trash,” Mekki cites 30 reasons why 
Tunisia has struggled to fulfill the promise of the Revolution. This list paints a 
picture of a Tunisian state that has undergone transition in little more than its 
form of government. Mekki calls the “democratic transition” nothing but a 
“slogan… that relieves the state of tyranny towards political freedom.” He makes 
clear that it is not the democratic transition itself that he opposes but rather the 
use of it as a talking point to obscure the failure of the government to sufficiently 
provide for the people. Instead of using the democratic transition to explain away 
the failures of the new system, Mekki suggests a “qualitative transition in the 
state and society.” Mekki’s qualitative transition would not be controlled by any 
one group, but rather would be simultaneously disparate and adverse to 
coalitional politics which Mekki argues prevent the achievement of revolutionary 
social change. Mekki suggests that given the already established unity of the 
Tunisian people across political blocs as proven by the Revolution, a “political 
restructuring of the State from the bottom up” that disperses state power would 
result in the type of economic and social change that the current government has 
failed to deliver. Ultimately, Mekki blames elites for co-opting the successes of 
the Revolution and believes the Revolution to be fundamentally unfinished.  44
Mekki has believed in the longevity of this revolutionary project since 
before Kasbah 3. In a May 2011, in an interview with Francophone newspaper Le 
Presse, Mekki expressed his optimism at the possibility of a continuation of the 
44 Ridha Mekki, “؟ةیسنوتلا ةروثلا لطعتل اجرخم - ةیخیراتلا ةلتكلا - ةركف لثمت له” Modern Discussion, May 
19th, 2015, 
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=468588&fbclid=IwAR2fstDSYZcRU1OTaMP_D
q6xwOLuDNfnC-E9g4Y7FaLTqafAeJzcfr94Jz0​. Trans. Rym Bouderbala (La Marsa: 2019) 
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revolution despite the lull in actions after Kasbah 2 stating that, “the people need 
time to sharpen their weapons.” His interview further reinforces the notion of the 
FTL as an organization dedicated to structural rather than ideological change. 
According to Mekki this structural change should come in the form of a state that 
has broad social and economic responsibilities – not interventionist or Keynesian 
ones – and where control is granted to regions over a central government.  45
Kasbah 3 politics need not propose a specific solution to the failures of 
Tunisian institutions as Mekki’s does. The movement was, by nature, vaguer and 
based on a revolutionary coalition rather than the thoughts of an individual. It did, 
however, closely align with Mekki’s belief in the continuation of revolutionary 
movement against Western and elite influence. Among a number of other 
demands specific to the Revolution, the sit-in sought to continue the Revolution 
while demanding further inclusion of a diverse coalition of revolutionary youth in 
the High Political Reform Commission, established to oversee the 
implementation of revolutionary reforms. The official demands of Kasbah 3 also 
called for the cancellation of debt and disentanglement from foreign influences 
(see Appendix F).  It is in these demands that the doctrine of Ridha Mekki, the 46
politics of Kasbah 3, and the campaign of Kais Saied intersect.  
In alignment with the ideology of Mekki, Kais Saied centered his 
campaign on empowering localities and decentralizing government.  While he 47
advocated for a conservative social politics, Saied continually insisted that these 
45 Samir Dridi, “​Tête pensante de la campagne de Kaïs Saïed: Ridha Lénine, un stratège passé 
quasiment inaperçu” October 17th, 2019, La Presse, 
https://lapresse.tn/29866/tete-pensante-de-la-campagne-de-kais-saied-ridha-lenine-un-stratege-pas
se-quasiment-inapercu/​. 
463 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​ i​ “ماصتعإ يف ةیبعش بلاطم نوكتل نلآا دح ىلغ اهیلع قفّتملا ةیساسلأا بلاطملا” Facebook. 
47 Munathara, “Tonight’s #Tunisia Debate”  
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personal beliefs were not part of his political goals. Saied’s politics go beyond the 
reforms suggested by Mekki. In a 2018 lecture at the University of Tunis titled 
“Its Religion is Islam” (referencing to Article One of the 2014 Tunisian 
Constitution) Saied spells out his views on the influence of the West and Islamic 
thought on Tunisian politics. The lecture covers the relationship between religion, 
the state, and a third distinction made by Kais Said: the nation.   48
In the lecture, Saied argues that constitutional declaration of a state 
religion is a Western ideal and that Islamic thought has always considered the 
question of state religion as settled, not a necessary aspect to include in a 
constitution. The inclusion of such a clause, according to Saied, puts the state in 
the difficult position of litigating the meaning of such a clause which inevitably 
forces the state to make legal judgements on what is and is not Islamic. He cites 
Somalia, Egypt, and Iran as examples of Western intervention resulting in the 
creation of such clauses. For Saied the role of Islam should be present in the 
nation not the state. It is not something that should be codified or embedded in 
the state, rather it should be forged through social and political efforts. This 
distinction informs Saied’s claim that his socially conservative stances are not a 
mark of Islamism, but rather politically insignificant personal views. The 
distinction here can be made between what Mekki conception “ideology” and 
structural reform. Saied’s ideology is undoubtedly rooted in Islam, but under 
Mekki’s definition of ideology, Saied’s political project is not ideological, it is 
48 Kais Saied, “Its Religion is Islam” Commmencment at the University of Tunis, September 14th, 
2018, ​https://ultratunisia.ultrasawt.com/
تلایلحت/ةسایس/سنوت-ارتلا/ةلودلاو-نیدلا-نیب-ةقلاعلا-يف-رفحیو-صوغی-دّیعس-سیق-اهنید-ملاسلإا, Trans. Mohamed 
Obaid, Kirkuk 2019. 
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structural. While skepticism of Mekki’s conception of ideology – which places 
structural changes outside its scope – is reasonable, it is still helpful in 
understanding how Saied thinks of the relationship between his conservative 
beliefs and his political platform of decentralization. For Saied, the issue of Islam 
is not a state issue, it is a national one. It is not for a constitution to dictate but is 
rather for the people to decide. Such conceptions of the relationship between 
Islam and the state expand upon ideals of Kasbah 3 that seek a revolt against 
Western thought and calls for a reimagination of the state.   49
Not all movements emerging from Kasbah 3 built upon the sit-in’s 
ideology in this way. Constitutional scholar Jaouhar Ben M’Barek, an attendee of 
the sit-in, later formed the Destourna Network.  Founded after protests in 50
Mahdia calling for youth participation in the constitutional writing process, the 
Destourna Network has adopted causes related to constitutional issues ranging 
from women’s rights to civil liberties. ,  Ben M’Barek has since become an 51 52
ascendant figure in Tunisian politics. Neither an ally nor an enemy of Kais Saied, 
Ben M’Barek has been openly critical of Saied’s policies, but a careful look at his 
criticisms reveals their common connection to Kasbah 3 ideology. While 
outspoken in his criticisms on Saied’s vision of the structure of the Tunisian 
government and his socially conservative politics, Ben M’Barek has praised 
Saied as a trustworthy figure citing his dedication to revolutionary ideals.  While 53
49 Kais Saied, “Its Religion is Islam”  
50AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
51 Participedia, “Tharek (T7arek)” Accessed December 8, 2019, 
https://participedia.net/organization/6253​. 
52Arab.org, “Destourna Beja” Accessed December 8, 2019, 
https://arab.org/directory/doustourna-beja/​. 
53 Business News, “Témoignage de Jaouhar Ben M'barek à propos de Kaïs Saïed”  
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the ideologies and politics of Saied and Ben M’Barek differ, they have a common 
root in Kasbah 3 politics.  
The Tunisian Revolution marked the first opportunity since the nation’s 
independence to form a politics separate from Bourguiba, Ben Ali, and Islam. 
Kasbah 1 and Kasbah 2 were vital to the success of the Revolution as a project of 
democratic transition, but they failed to form a new politics to stand in contrast 
with old political dynamics. Kasbah 3 sought not only to reinforce its vision of a 
successful democratic transition, but also sought to forge a politics centered in 
revolutionary ideals that could challenge political Islam and Bourguibism. While 
Kasbah 3 alone did not construct these politics, it provided an opportunity for 
individuals interested in perpetuating revolutionary politics to identify 
themselves, make connections, and emerge into public politics. The movements 
that emerged are not uniform, but they are rooted in an anti-Western, 
anti-institutional politics that calls for a revival of revolutionary spirit. In the 
eight years since Kasbah 3, people and organizations like the FTL, Ridha Mekki, 
Kais Saied, and Jaouhar Ben M’Barek have helped these ideas evolve into more 
complete theories that can be deployed in traditional political spheres rather than 
on the streets. The evolution of Kasbah 3 was not instant, but its eventual 
emergence in the 2019 Presidential election proved its validity as a force in 
Tunisia’s future.   54
 
 
 
54AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
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Democracy and Maturity: A Conversation with a Kasbah 3 Convert 
I sat down with Firas at his home in La Marsa, a suburb of Tunis. Firas 
lives in Paris but had returned to Tunisia while awaiting a new work visa. He had 
just returned from a walk in the woods when we met for our interview. His dog 
had caught two Grouse which he was in the process of defeathering​.​ Before he 
moved abroad for work, Firas lived in Tunis. During the Revolution he attended 
all three sit-ins though he made clear that he attended Kasbah 3 not as an 
ideologue but as a supportive observer. He believed that the Revolution had 
ended with Kasbah 2 but sympathized with the goals of the protest. Now, after 
nearly a decade of a stagnant economy and political gridlock, he thinks 
differently about the sit-in, its goals, and the politics that emerged.  55
Firas’s initial skepticism of Kasbah 3 stemmed largely from a desire to 
begin the process of rebuilding the nation’s government. Pressures such as rising 
debt and a spiraling economy created an environment in which Tunisian citizens, 
especially young people, sought greater stability. According to Firas there was a 
sentiment that “we had what we wanted” and that Kasbah 3 potentially threatened 
it. While he agreed with broader aims to root out corruption and the RCD, he felt 
that Tunisia was ready to move out of a state of revolution.  56
Firas also described a motivation of Kasbah 3 that I came across little 
evidence to support, but nevertheless is worthy of consideration. Pinning 
Tunisia’s current political challenges on the 2014 Constitution, Firas stated that, 
“Kasbah 1 was right” in that it called for a change in government but not a 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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destruction of the 1959 Constitution and that “Kasbah 3 was also right” in what 
he saw as an attempt to push for a new constitution not written through a 
democratic process but on the terms of the protesters. While Firas had celebrated 
Kasbah 2’s success, today he fears that the election of a body to write the 2014 
Constitution caused an entrenchment of Islamist power. According to Firas, the 
protesters at Kasbah 3 understood this threat and believed that a democratically 
drafted constitution would result in an entrenched of the politics they feared. This 
suggestion that Kasbah 3 politics were anti-democratic cannot be confirmed but 
also should not be dismissed. On the surface an anti-democratic politics seems 
fundamentally incongruent with Kasbah 3, but many structural changes that 
protesters sought were unlikely to be a product of a constitution drafted by a 
democratically elected body. The interest of any elected body with the 
opportunity to draft a constitution is to entrench power both for the politicians 
who have been elected and the body itself. Unsurprisingly, the constitution 
drafted by the National Constituent Assembly (which essentially acted as a 
parliament) left little power to the executive, the courts or to local governments. 
The protesters of Kasbah 3 wanted the new constitution to be the product of the 
Revolution, not the result of a process occurring years after the Revolution had 
ceased. Although the suggestion that Kasbah 3’s aims were anti-democratic is 
questionable given that its demands included a solidification of the election date, 
it is worth considering the possibility that this strand of politics existed within the 
movement. ,   57 58
573 ةبصقلا ماصتعإ,​ i​ “ماصتعإ يف ةیبعش بلاطم نوكتل نلآا دح ىلغ اهیلع قفّتملا ةیساسلأا بلاطملا” Facebook. 
58 AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
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Firas thoroughly refuted arguments that Kasbah 3 was an Islamist 
movement but nuanced this by admitting that the fears propelling these 
accusations were legitimate. “Now when you call them Islamists people 
sometimes laugh at you,” he quipped, but he also described the fear during the 
Revolution that Islamists would co-opt the movement. According to Firas this 
made it “easy for the establishment to criticize [Kasbah 3] by saying ‘it’s 
Islamist’.” Firas sees the invalidation of these accusations over the last several 
years as central to the success of Kasbah 3 politics today stating, “one of the 
things that helped it… to become what it is today – accepted – is that the Islamist 
fear is not the same from 2011 to now.” It also took time though, the way Firas 
sees it, “Kasbah 3 lived for 8 years now and now it evolved with democracy and 
now we have a President from Kasbah 3. So it is like Kasbah 3 is living again a 
little bit, but more mature.” This perception of maturity is essential to 
understanding the initial failure and deferred success of Kasbah 3. The sentiment 
that Kasbah 3 was inimical to focusing on debt and improving stability stemmed 
from perceptions that the movement sought only to disrupt.  Eight years of 
constructing civil society organizations, making arguments in the press, and 
cultivating political candidates has allowed the movement to portray itself as 
more serious in its ability to carry out its goals.   59
In the 2019 Presidential elections, Firas voted for Kais Saied. Describing 
the first time he read his platform Firas said, “I totally understood what he wanted 
because I had all of what I had lived during Kasbah living again.” Bourguibism 
59 AJ Braverman, 2019, Interview with Kasbah 3 attendee, La Marsa, November 26, 2019. 
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seeks to draw upon the nostalgia of national unity and stability. Islamism seeks to 
draw upon nostalgia rooted in religion. The Revolution, however, evokes ripe 
memories of possibility reminding people of a time where they had the power to 
topple governments. With a platform of structural reforms, this feeling of 
possibility was not just beneficial to Kais Saied, it was necessary to build a 
coalition large enough to give him a mandate. Possibly its most crucial asset, the 
ability of the Kais Saied campaign to evoke the collective memory of the 
Revolution enabled them to build a coalition across religious-secular divisions. 
Nearly nine years after the Revolution, the movement remains alive in the 
memory of the Tunisian people. By evoking a nostalgia for this time of 
possibility, Kais Saied built a mandate for the reconstruction of the Tunisian 
government on the terms of the Revolution. While the opinions of Firas are 
certainly not representative of everyone, they are instructive as to how a political 
outsider, using a sit-in of a couple hundred radicals as a springboard, 
reconstructed the Revolution in the minds of millions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Little can be definitively said about Kasbah 3. Who attended, their exact 
goals, and what took place is largely unknown. It is possible that the accusations 
against it are true. It is possible that Islamists planned the sit-in as Essebsi’s 
accusations suggest and it is possible that the movement was indeed planned as 
an anti-democratic one however these statements cannot be definitive. What we 
Braverman 30 
 
do know is that the movement was diverse and the aims not universally agreed 
upon, we know the official demands and statements as posted on the Facebook 
page, and we know the movements founded by its attendees. From this 
information, a picture of a revolutionary, anti-Western, and anti-establishment 
politics can be pieced together. 
Saied’s landslide victory marked the emergence of a new politics rooted 
in a reimagining of the state inspired in accordance with the Revolutionary ideals 
of Kasbah 3. While Saied is the current torchbearer of the Kasbah 3 movement, 
he – by no means – has a monopoly on this politics. The fading religious-secular 
paradigm has opened the door for others who build their ideologies to appeal to 
Tunisia’s revolutionary, anti-establishment spirit. While Saied has built on 
Kasbah 3 politics with his own theories about the nature of the state, others like 
Jaouhar Ben M’Barek have had success with other constructions. Evoking a 
revolutionary politics presents an alternative to appeals to the traditional paths of 
Tunisian politics: political Islam and Bourguibism. Whether this politics will 
continue to ascend remains to be seen, but what is certain is that eight years after 
the Revolution, movements, ideologies, and individuals related to Kasbah 3 have 
firmly planted their roots in Tunisian politics. An echo of Kasbah 3, the 2019 
Presidential elections have empowered a movement that sees past the 
secular-religious dynamic of pre-revolutionary Tunisia.  
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Appendix C 
 
Post text:​ What is your opinion about these demands? What is your comment 
about the proposed candidates? 
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Appendix D 
 
Post text:​ Hilary Clinton will arrive to Tunisia and will bring her evil with her. 
Show your ‘hospitality.’ Tomorrow at 10 am, we will start a peaceful protest at 
Al-Habibi Street and we will march against Hilary Clinton’s visit to Tunisia. Be 
there. Let’s give the world a lesson that we don’t accept foreign interference. No 
to America. No France. I am Tunisian and proud. 
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 Post text:​ We don’t recognize Israel 
 
 
Post text:​ Long live Tunisia. Long live the youth of the revolution. And glory to 
the martyrs. 
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Appendix F 
 
Post text:  
The main demands agreed upon, by popular demand, for the “Friday return” are: 
1. Restructuring the High Political Reform Commission by removing Yadh 
Ben Achour and Zionist members. Youth from the revolution should be 
included in the new structure of the institution to maintain balance and 
ensure the full representation of people of different backgrounds. 
2. Resignation of Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice 
3. Resignation of the Judiciary 
4. Accountability for the killers of martyrs and people charged with 
corruption 
5. Enact general amnesty for remaining political prisoners  
6. Adhere to the election date of October 23, ensuring that it is transparent 
and fair. Prior registration for election should be abandoned and people all 
that is needed should be an ID. 
7. Criminalizing support for Israel and Zionist entities 
8. Withdrawal of assembly party licenses 
9. Efforts should be taken to cancel all debts  
10. No foreign ‘guardianship’ or interference should be allowed in Tunisian 
affairs 
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